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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NOS. 43434 & 43435 
      ) 
v.      ) ADA COUNTY NOS. 
      ) CR 2015-517 & CR 2015-2130 
JADE ROSE MOODY,   )  
      ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
________________________________ ) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 In the first of these two consolidated cases, Jade Moody pled guilty to battery on 
a law enforcement officer and was sentenced to a unified term of five years, with one 
year fixed.  In the second case, Ms. Moody pled guilty to grand theft and was sentenced 
to a consecutive unified term of five years, with two years fixed, for an aggregate 
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.  She contends the district court abused its 
discretion by imposing an excessive aggregate sentence in light of the mitigating factors 
that exist in this case.  She also contends the district court abused its discretion by 
denying her motions pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for reduction of her 
sentences.  
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 While apparently under the influence of methamphetamine, Ms. Moody grabbed 
a woman by her throat and allegedly banged her head against the wall.  (Presentence 
Investigation Report (“PSI”), pp.3-4, 25, 31.)  During the investigation of the incident, 
Ms. Moody kicked a police officer in the chest and legs and refused to submit to arrest.  
(PSI, p.4.)  Four days later, Ms. Moody was riding in a vehicle with the brother of the 
owner of the vehicle and his girlfriend.  (PSI, pp.4-5.)  When the brother of the owner of 
the vehicle exited the vehicle to use the restroom, Ms. Moody drove off in the vehicle 
with the girlfriend, and was apprehended approximately four hours later in Oregon.  
(PSI, pp.5, 64.) 
In Case No. 2015-517, Ms. Moody was charged by complaint with felony battery 
on a law enforcement officer, misdemeanor battery, and resisting or obstructing an 
officer.  (R., pp.7-9.)  The complaint was amended to add a charge of misdemeanor 
battery on a law enforcement officer.  (R., pp.49-52.)  Ms. Moody waived a preliminary 
hearing and was bound over to the district court.  (R., p.56.)  The State then filed an 
Information charging Ms. Moody with these same crimes.  (R., pp.57-59.)  Ms. Moody 
entered into a plea agreement with the State pursuant to which she agreed to plead 
guilty to felony battery on a law enforcement officer.  (R., pp.63-64; Tr. p.42, L.17 – 
p.43, L.13.)  The State agreed to recommend a unified sentence of five years, with two 
years fixed, and to recommend that the sentence be suspended and that Ms. Moody be 
placed on probation.  (R., pp.63-64.) 
In Case No. 2015-2130, Ms. Moody was charged by complaint with one count of 
grand theft.  (R., pp.332-33.)  Ms. Moody waived a preliminary hearing and was bound 
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over to the district court.  (R., p.369.)  The State then filed an Information charging 
Ms. Moody with this same crime.  (R., pp.370-71.)  Ms. Moody entered into a plea 
agreement with the State pursuant to which she agreed to plead guilty and the State 
agreed to recommend a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and to 
recommend that the sentence be suspended and Ms. Moody be placed on probation.  
(R., pp.374-75.) 
The two cases were handled together for further proceedings.  (R., pp.69, 376.)  
Ms. Moody pled guilty to felony battery on a law enforcement officer and grand theft.  
(R., pp.65-66; Tr. p.65, Ls.1-6.)  The court sentenced Ms. Moody to a unified sentence 
of five years, with one year fixed, for battery on a law enforcement officer.  (Tr., p.86, 
Ls.1-7.)  It sentenced Ms. Moody to a unified sentence of five years, with two years 
fixed, for grand theft.  (Tr., p.86, Ls.8-14.)  The court ordered the sentences to run 
consecutively.  (Tr., p.86, Ls.14-16.)  The judgments were entered on June 9, 2015.  
(R., pp.73-76, 385-88.)  Ms. Moody filed timely notices of appeal.  (R., pp.78-81, 394-
97.)  On October 7, 2015, Ms. Moody filed two Rule 35 motions for reduction of 
sentence, supported by multiple exhibits.  (R., pp.88-325, 407-644.)  The district court 
denied Ms. Moody’s Rule 35 motions by orders dated October 16, 2015.  (R., pp.326-
28, 645-47.)  Ms. Moody’s appeals were consolidated on August 13, 2015.  (R., p.2.) 
 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Ms. Moody an 
aggregate sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, in light of the mitigating 
factors that exist? 
 







The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Ms. Moody An 
Aggregate Sentence Of Ten Years, With Three Years Fixed, In Light Of The Mitigating 
Factors That Exist 
 
Ms. Moody asserts that, given any view of the facts, her aggregate sentence of 
ten years, with three years fixed, is excessive.  Where, as here, the sentence imposed 
by the district court is within statutory limits, “the appellant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.”  State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 
(2011) (quoting State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875 (2011)).  “When a trial court 
exercises its discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental requirement is 
reasonableness.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608 (1991)).  “A 
sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of 
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, 
rehabilitation or retribution.”  Id. (citation omitted).  “When reviewing the reasonableness 
of a sentence this Court will make an independent examination of the record, ‘having 
regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of 
the public interest.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)). 
The most important factor for the Court to independently examine here is the 
character of the offender.  Ms. Moody was twenty-five years old when she committed 
the instant offenses.  (PSI, p.1.)  She had no prior adult felony convictions.  (PSI, p.31.)  
She did, however, have an extensive juvenile record and a history of substance abuse 
and mental health problems.  (PSI, pp.12, 23-26.)  Ms. Moody became involved with the 
criminal justice system at the age of twelve and was charged three times with running 
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away, in addition to other offenses.  (PSI, p.12.)  She had previously been diagnosed 
with bipolar disorder, PTSD, borderline personality, ADHD, anxiety, and obsessive 
compulsive disorder, and she had a history of mental health hospitalizations.  (PSI, 
pp.32, 159.)  She had been homeless since 2013, and had lost parental rights to her 
daughter.  (PSI, pp.17, 19.)  Ms. Moody was clearly in need of substance abuse and 
mental health treatment, not a term of incarceration.   
At sentencing, the prosecutor stated the State was “going to stick with the plea 
agreement and recommend probation in this case.”  (Tr., p.70, Ls.1-3.)  Ms. Moody 
stated she “hope[d] for probation.” (Tr., p.81, L.7.)  The presentence investigator 
concluded Ms. Moody was “a good candidate for an order of retained jurisdiction” and 
recommended screening for mental health court as an alternative.  (PSI, p.33.)  Despite 
the recommendations of the State, Ms. Moody and the presentence investigator, the 
district court neither suspended Ms. Moody’s sentence nor retained jurisdiction.  
Instead, it imposed an aggregate sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.  It 
appears that the court was extremely concerned about Ms. Moody’s juvenile history, 
and questioned whether she could be successful on probation.    
The district court asked the prosecutor whether the State was aware of 
Ms. Moody’s juvenile history at the time it entered into the plea agreement.  (Tr., p.70, 
Ls.4-6.)  The prosecutor stated he could not tell, but could not “say for sure that they 
didn’t know about it.”  (Tr., p.70, Ls.7-13.) The prosecutor then said, “I don’t think there’s 
any question that she’s not ready for probation at this point.”  (Tr., p.70, Ls.15-20.)  
Counsel for Ms. Moody asked the court why it had inquired into whether the State was 
aware of Ms. Moody’s juvenile history.  (Tr., p.73, Ls.7-11.)  The court responded, “The 
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purpose of that inquiry was if the State had been aware of the juvenile history, I would 
have been surprised by the State’s probation recommendation.”  (Tr., p.73, Ls.12-15.)  
The court’s statements at sentencing reveal that it sentenced Ms. Moody based in large 
part on her juvenile history.   
Ms. Moody committed battery on a law enforcement officer, but it appears that 
she did so while high on methamphetamine, and her conduct may have stemmed from 
her drug use and her PTSD.  (PSI, p.4; Tr., p.61, Ls.11-24.)  Ms. Moody also committed 
grand theft, but the facts of the offense are not as egregious as they could have been.  
Ms. Moody did not steal a car from a stranger, but instead drove off when the driver of 
the car in which she was traveling exited the vehicle to use the bathroom.  (PSI, p.5.)  
There was a passenger in the vehicle with her at the time she was stopped (who initially 
stated the vehicle was hers), and it is unclear what Ms. Moody’s intentions were with 
respect to the vehicle.  (PSI, p.5.).  Ms. Moody never presented a threat to the public at 
large and all of the facts warrant a sentence of probation or a period of retained 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Ms. Moody’s Rule 35 Motions 
 
“A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to 
the sound discretion of the sentencing court . . . and essentially is a plea for leniency 
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.”  State v. 
Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).  “The denial of a motion for modification of a 
sentence will not be disturbed absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.”  
Id.  In examining a district court’s denial of a motion for modification, this Court 
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“examine[s] the probable duration of confinement in light of the nature of the crime, the 
character of the offender and the objectives of sentencing, which are the protection of 
society, deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution.”  Id.    
 As discussed above, the district court was concerned with Ms. Moody’s juvenile 
history at sentencing, and was concerned about whether Ms. Moody could be 
successful on probation.  The court’s concerns should have been put to rest by the 
materials Ms. Moody submitted in support of her Rule 35 motion, which included 
hundreds of pages of notes and lists and workbook pages evidencing Ms. Moody’s work 
on her recovery.  (R., pp.88-325, 407-644.)  Ms. Moody also submitted a letter from 
another inmate who stated that Ms. Moody “is doing wonderful” and “has changed.”  
(R., pp.325, 644.)   
 The district court had entered an order for Ms. Moody to participate in a 
substance abuse program and an active behavioral change program prior to 
sentencing.  (R., p.67.)  Ms. Moody was not able to participate in these programs prior 
to sentencing due to lack of funding.  (Tr., p.78, Ls.19-21.)  Thus, at the time of 
sentencing, the court did not have any information about whether Ms. Moody could 
succeed in programming.  The court was concerned that she could not, and would not 
be successful on probation.  The court thus refused to suspend Ms. Moody’s sentence, 
despite the recommendation of the State, and refused to retain jurisdiction, despite the 
recommendation of the presentence investigator.  At the time Ms. Moody submitted her 
Rule 35 motion, it was clear that Ms. Moody could (and had) benefitted from 
programming and could (and would) be successful on probation.  In light of this 
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additional information, the district court abused its discretion in denying Ms. Moody’s 
Rule 35 motions. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Moody respectfully requests that the Court suspend her sentences and place 
her on probation.  Alternatively, she requests that the Court reduce her sentences as it 
deems appropriate or vacate her sentences and remand to the district court for 
resentencing. 
 DATED this 4th day of January, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
 9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of January, 2016, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy 
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
 
JADE ROSE MOODY 
INMATE #115502 
CASSIA COUNTY JAIL 
1415 ALBION AVENUE 
BURLEY ID 83318 
  
MELISSA MOODY 




ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
  
KENNETH K JORGENSEN 







      ___________/s/______________ 
      EVAN A. SMITH 
      Administrative Assistant 
 
AWR/eas 
